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Leon E. Trakman* Canadian Law Schools: In
Search of Excellence
What makes a law school sound? credible? even excellent? Surely
many things: leadership potential, good faculty and good students, a
solid public image and communication. Greatness comes from
knowing our own strengths and weaknesses, our institutional
purposes. In short, achievement flows from how we evaluate
ourself and how others evaluate us.'
A law school must seek to satisfy many goals. Ideally, every legal
institution should strive to excel as a facility of learning, as a bastion
of intellectual fervor, as an instrument satisfying community needs.
Yet each of these goals are themselves variable in kind. Teaching
expertise in one legal community represents undesirable teaching
standards in another institution. Scholarly contribution in one
setting may well be construed as scholarly inertia elsewhere.
Achievement and productivity are therefore relative values; for their
substance depends on their capacity to satisfy identifiable needs,
responding to institutional interests and community concerns.
2
*Leon E. Trakman, B. Comm., L.L.B. (Cape Town), LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard).
Professor of Law, Dalhousie Law School. For other writings by the author on legal
education as cited infra in notes, see Trakman, The Need for Legal Training in
International, Comparative and Foreign Law: Foreign Lawyers at American Law
Schools (1976) 27 J. Leg. Ed., 509-551; Trakman, Law Student Teachers: An
Untapped Resource, (1979) 30 J. Leg., Ed., 331-357.
1. On the ingredients that are required to foster an efficacious regime of legal
education in Canada, see inter alia: Cohen, The Condition of Legal Education in
Canada, (1950) 28 Can. Bar Rev. 267; Cohen, (1979) 4 Hearsay 9; Fridman, Legal
Education in Canada, (1970) 120 New L.J. 901; Lederman, Canadian Legal
Education in the Second Half of the Twentieth Century, (1971) 21 U.T.L.J. 141;
Gibson, Legal Education: Past and Future, (1974) 6 Man. L.J. 211.
2. Perhaps the most traditional enquiry about legal education relates to the link
between law and society. Is the law school the initiator of social change; or does
society dictate, and forever control, the dynamics of legal education? See hereon,
Wade, Legal Education and the Demands for Stability and Change through Law,
(1963) 17 Vand. L.R. 155. For a forceful view on the role of legal education in the
American context, see Griswold, Legal Education: 1879-1978 (1978) 64
A.B.A.L.J. 1051.
It should be noted that the "ideal" ingredients of a legal education include, inter
alia, introducing the law student to the legal system, exposing him to the mles and
principles of substantive law, preparing him for the practice of law, or simply,
training him to "think like a lawyer" (whatever that may mean). In truth, legal
education involves all these ingredients, and others still. The real goal of our law
schools lies in determining that mix of educational purposes which best satisfies the
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Accordingly, what we think of ourselves and what others think the
role of the law school, its educational and societal function, should
be, will likely flow from a compromise of valued judgements.
Indeed, each response will vary from person to person, and from
environment to environment as each cog in the organization
considers worthwhile goals and meaningful purposes differently.
What is written below is therefore premised on the understanding
that others may well disagree with the author and so they should if
educational advance is to be promoted in our law schools through
debate, through the conciliation of divergent opinions and
ultimately, through the innovation itself.
One inescapable level of achievement worthy of any Canadian
law school is that of academic - teaching and scholarly -
excellence. History has shown that law schools have produced
"leaders" of society in the past and still need to be "leaders" of
society in the future if they are to serve as training centres for
leadership in community affairs. After all, our law schools help to
contribute towards producing the judges and the legal scholars, the
practitioners and the politicians who function at the very forefront of
Canadian life. Our law schools therefore provide Canada with a
heritage in education aimed at identifiable ends. As academic
centres, they serve as bastions of legal and societal learning. They
are geared to provide lessons in legal reasoning. They are oriented
to foster an analysis of the law stricto sensu, and the law as
enveloped within a juridical, a legislative and an administrative
synthesis. a
No academic institution can realistically function unless it strives
towards achievement as an institution of higher learning. Law
schools need scholarly input. They need to develop academic
activity among law students, among law faculties, and among the
socio-cultural and political concerns of our Canadian society. Accordingly, the
"ideal" role of the Canadian lawyer ultimately subserves to the dictates of
community need.
3. Excellence - that higher ideal - is repeatedly emphasized in commentaries
about Canadian legal education. Striving towards excellence in teaching and in
scholarship are primary motivating forces in widening the parameters of legal
education. Nor is the axiom of excellence defeated by the suggestion that
excellence defies analysis; it is surely the striving towards excellence, whatever its
precise definition, that encourages and facilitates innovation in law school
programmes. See hereon, Read, Aims and Practices of University Education in the
Faculty of Law at Dalhousie, (1964) 1 Can. Legal Studies 3; Fridman, Legal
Education in Canada, (1970) 120 New L.J. 901; Veitch and Macdonald, Law
Teachers and Their Jurisdiction, (1978) 56 Can. Bar Rev. 710, 715-6.
Canadian Law Schools: In Search of Excellence 305
practicing bar. Research requires a generous financing of reading
and writing activities. It means a willingness by the institution to set
aside time in which faculty are given the opportunity, indeed the
constant encouragement, to develop their academic pursuits in the
form of reports, articles, books, and other manifestations of
scholarship. Publication is a source of public image. Research is
necessary to show that an institution is "alive" and "well",
fostering legal skills and knowledge and holding such information
available to judge and lawyer, student and teacher alike. While
good scholarship does not necessarily mean good teaching ability,
an informed teacher who spends time cultivating his own
knowledge and reproducing that knowledge in written form does
foster his own self-confidence in his subject areas and at the same
time, he promotes respect for scholastic achievement. 4
Yet academia requires considerable effort, daily toil and much
frustration. Writing enterprises warrant encouragement for the
efforts expended in the pursuit of learning. There is need for
developing academic dialogue through debate and discussion as an
ongoing process, demanding ever more exacting standards of
performance from participants in their pursuit of learning. Awards
for achievement are necessary as a reflection of self-respect and
mutual respect, as a means of promoting role models in scholarship
and in order to induce healthy competition among and within
faculties of law. It is true that the "publish or perish" syndrome
does not necessarily promote scholarship that is worthy, reflecting a
high quality of learning and skill in writing. Yet to encourage
writing through formal institutional channels and through informal
dialogue is a step towards a worthy end. It is a necessary pathway
along any route towards excellence. 5
4. No doubt we can criticize our Canadian law teachers for failing to attain that
final plateau of academic excellence at which point originality of thought and
clarity of vision abounds. See Arthurs, Paradoxes of Canadian Legal Education,
(1977), 3 Dal. L.J. 639-662. But surely that level of attainment is only a final
revelation, attained by few, but sought by many. Surely such excellence should be
a guiding light, not a requisite for all, nor a chastisement to those who, despite
effort, find such ultimate achievement beyond their toiling grasp. Is not our
primary goal as a youthful system to encourage scholarship so as to render the
vision of ultimate learning realistically accessible - rather than nostalgically
inaccessible!
5. On the difficult role of the law teacher who is himself trained in a study of
"the" law stricto sensu, yet who must function within an interdisciplinary
environment, see Bergin, The Law Teacher: A Man Divided Against Himself,
(1968) 54 Va. L.R. 637.
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As regards the classroom, teaching ability is partly inherent,
reflecting the personality and communication traits of the teacher,
and partly acquired through environmental forces. Teachers can
develop instinctively or be trained to develop teaching
methodologies, However, few teaching techniques in law are
formally taught in LL.B. and LL.M. programmes. Law teachers are
trained rather in the substance of law than in its instruction. 6 A duty
therefore rests upon each law school to foster its own teaching
traditions within an indigenous yet comparative setting for the
benefit of teachers and students alike. We need to conduct debate
over the interrelationship between teaching and learning. We need
to encourage dialogue over teaching techniques. Finally, we need a
healthy environment in which law teachers can constantly strive to
improve upon their skills as instructors with the realization that
self-criticism and a willingness to accept constructive criticism from
others can significantly enrich the teacher's skill in the classroom. 7
Equally importantly, teaching methodology should be taught to
those who themselves profess to teach. There is a need for teaching
clinics available to law teachers, staffed by persons with expertise in
legal education. Law teachers require an exposure to the methods of
conveying information in the classroom. They need to learn how to
ask and how to answer questions and how to develop an atmosphere
of participation within their classes. Formal and informal symposia
in law are required in which law teachers are exposed to novel
teaching methodologies and to a critical assessment of the
casebook, the Socratic and the lecture methods of teaching. The law
teacher needs to be exposed to the proper use of classroom facilities,
to the blackboard and to the diaz, to illustrative teaching and
learning techniques, whether they be pictoral, graphic or diagramic
in nature.8
6. See hereon the commentators in notes 1 and 3 supra.
7. It is significant to note that developments in this direction have already
commenced, beginning with the "Banff Experience, 1979". In this symposium a
steering committee of the Canadian Law Deans ran a Teaching Clinic with the
explicit aim of exposing Canadian law teachers, primarily "new" teachers, to
diverse teaching and learning techniques. Dialogue and demonstrations, aided by
audio-visual facilities, were employed as a means of promoting self-and mutual
criticism among participants. (Canadian Law Teachers Clinic, Banff, Alberta, June
1979). See further Draft Proposal for a Centre for Studies in Canadian Legal
Education, submitted by Neil Gold and John McLaren (Nov. 1979); The Canadian
Law Teaching Clinic (Banff Centre, May 1980).
8. For extensive bibliographies on the use of teaching techniques to enchance
classroom performance see Trakman, Law Student Teachers: An Untapped
Resource (1979) 30 J. Leg. Ed. 331 notes 11, 15, 31, and 35.
Canadian Law Schools: In Searcti of Excellence 307
Ultimately, law teachers are both born and made. Exceptional
teaching talent will often lie in the character of the teacher, in his
human traits and in his intellectual perceptions. To that extent, the
teacher may bring into the teaching profession his or her own innate
communication skills. Yet by constructively evaluating barriers to
communication the legal educator can help to make the teacher,
enhancing the more productive aspects of law teaching, while
undermining the less beneficial features. After all, the professor, as
a teacher of law, should be trained in teaching techniques rather
than be forced to acquire such refined skills by way of incidental
osmosis.
How the teacher should actually teach law raises the most acute
difficulties of all - indeed, introducing queries which go to the
very root of the pragmatic tradition presently prevailing in North
American Law Schools. For Canadian Law Schools face the
dilemma of any hybrid legal tradition. While otr legal system is
principally English in its genesis, our educational tradition has
grown increasingly American in its orientation. Thus English law
provides us with the doctrines, the principles and the rules of law
which are followed throughout Canada. The American legal
system, in contrast, gives us the Langdellian tradition of teaching,
the casebook and the Socratic methodology, the pragmatic and the
functional approach towards legal analysis. 9 Our hybrid tradition is
not, in and of itself, harmful. A divergence in the content of law and
in the approach towards the teaching of law may well enlighten the
educational tradition within Canadian Law Schools. The harm lies
rather in our adopting the functional tradition of American law
schools into our own law schools without very carefully evaluating
the utility of the American conception of pragmatism within our
Canadian social context and without very deliberately observing the
potential clash between legal doctrine and legal functionalism
within our Canadian institutions. Consequently, difficulties arise
where law courses are taught in a piecemeal fashion, compartmen-
talized within a range of diverse course headings and tied together
by very loose juridical strings. Indeed, the conceptualized
foundation of the common law, 10 as our English forefathers have
9. Id., notes 9 and 11.
10. On the division between "formalism" and "pragmatism" in jurisprudence,
see Hart, The Concept of Law (1961); Samek, The Legal Point of View (1974);
Summers, The New Analytical Jurists (1966) 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 861;
Bodenheimer, Modem Analytical Jurisprudence and the Limits of its Usefulness
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shown, rebels in some considerable measure against an educational
system in which law courses cover off every nook and cranny of
substantive and adjectival law at the expense of the conceptualiza-
tion of legal principle.
Surely we must seriously question developments in legal
education in which the very rubric of legal concepts are allowed to
recede into oblivion as legal functionalism takes hold of our
common law system. Surely courses in law school should develop
our students' appreciation of law as an integrated system, founded
on logic and reason, rather than upon an unending range of
overlapping topics of substantive law. Our aspiring lawyers require
a foundation in a body of legal techniques, in a pattern of consistent
reasoning which is capable of systematization. They need a solid
foundation in juridical precepts, in that framework upon which our
common law finds its very basis. The adoption of the American
tradition of legal Realism 1 ' into our law school carries with it the
(1956), 104 U.Pa. L. Rev. 1080; Simpson, The Analysis of Legal Concepts
(1964), 80 L.Q.R. 535; Dworkin, The Model of Rules (1967), 35 U. Chi. L. Rev.
14; Hughes, Rules, Policy and Decision-Making (1968), 77 Yale L. J. 411; Weiler,
Two Models of Judicial Decision-Making (1968), 46 Can. Bar Rev. 406; Weinreb,
Law as Order (1978), 91 Harv. L. Rev. 909; James, Pragmatism, 50-9, 200-202
(1907); Wiener, Evolution and the Founders of Pragmatism (1949); Fuller,
American Legal Realism (1934), 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 429; Yntema, American Legal
Realism in Retrospect (1961), 14 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 317.
11. See note 10 supra on the nature and content of American Realism. For the
modem realist, law must be flexible so that rules of law are as variable as the
circumstances demand. No fact should be absolute for all times. No rule should
subsist for an eternity. Changing human sentiment, altered mores among mankind,
should be investigated anew. Karl Llewellyn found these composite elements in
"realism" "(a) A conception of law in flux; (b) a conception of law as a means to
social ends; (c) a conception of society in flux; (d) a separation of the "is" from the
"ought"; fe) a distrust of traditional legal rules and concepts; (f) a distrust of giving
too much importance to prescriptive rules in the decisional process; (g) a belief in
the value of grouping cases in narrow categories; (h) an insistence on evaluation by
reference to consequences; (i) a belief in the results which would be achieved by
programmed and sustained research projects investigating the facts." See
Llewellyn, Some Realism about Realism, (1931), 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1222.
While there is considerable merit in such realist observations about the role of
law as a functional system, it may well be questioned whether a law student - as
yet untried in the rules and principles of law - can master such pragmatic realities
before he has even grasped the roots of law as a study in legal substance. A
superstructure of legal doctrine must surely be firmly instilled in our law students'
minds before we, by information rather than by revelation, proceed to break down
the less viable elements in that legal superstructure. See esp. hereon Patton, The
Student, The Situation and Performance during the First Year of Law School
(1968), 21 J. Leg. Ed. 10; Levy, Attitudes of the Most Likely to Succeed: A
Survey of the First Year Class, Osgoode Hall Law School (1971); Kaufman,
Canadian Law Schools: In Search of Excellence 309
risk that our students will be exposed to far too much detail, to fact
upon fact, within an ever-increasing body of subject matter. Law
school syllabi are threatened with a mass of diverse courses, lacking
in appreciable systemization as we move hither and thither, seldom
stopping to reconsider how the whole process of legal education fits
together within a cogent framework. Within such a helter skelter
tradition, the role of law in the minds of our law students is likely to
remain as open-ended, as unsystematized in nature, as is the
educational system itself.
12
A structured educational framework must surely be instilled in
some measure in the minds of our prospective lawyers. Students
easily forget legal details over time. They seldom recall the facts of
cases years later. However, by cultivating in their minds a legal
foundation beyond mere detail the law school offers them its
greatest contribution. It provides the student a "well-rounded" yet a
thinking process of learning, a developed role as distinct from a
superficial trade school mentality. Surely our central concern as
educators should be purposeful, not the outgrowth of chance, nor
the product of unchanneled experience. Surely to reflect "we teach
thus" is simply to observe without illucidating upon why we teach
"thus". Are we not bound to strive towards a higher goal: towards
the systematization of legal education. Indeed, it is paradoxical that,
while we often adhere to the rigours of the American casebook
approach within our Canadian law schools, our American
counterparts display increasing reluctance to use a case method that
lacks in a defined purpose and are currently directing their attention
towards a more refined casebook-problem solving methodology in
law teaching. 13
Yet the rejection of unbridled American realism as the governing
model for Canadian legal education does not necessarily carry with
it an automatic rejuvenation of legal formalism for formalism's own
sake within our educational framework. If Canadian law schools fail
to foster their own growth in recognition of the socio-economic and
political structures surrounding Canadian law, they retard their
central function in the liaison between legal theory and legal
Advocacy as Craft - There is More to Law School Than a 'Paper Chase' (1974),
28 Sw.L. J. 495; Kennedy, How the Law School Fails: A Polemic, (1971), 1 Law
& Soc. Action 71.
12. Id.
13. See Trakman, supra note 8 where reference is made to critical commentaries
of the American casebook and Socratic methods of instruction. See especially
therein notes 5, 8, and 11.
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practice. The law school serves as the very fountainhead, the pivot,
of the legal system. It acts as the father, just as the lawyer serves as
the familial decendant. Law schools extract law students from the
community. They inject them back into the community. In short,
they fulfill a primary societal function, namely, the ordering of the
community through the services of their graduates. This societal
role demands that our law schools reflect, inter alia, the aspirations
of the university community, the Bar and society at large in
developing a framework for the effective systematization of legal
education. A legal institution that grows in comparative isolation
from the university sacrifices the interdisciplinary framework which
surrounds legal studies. A system of legal education which evolves
in disregard of the direction of social convention will surely give
rise to the unreality of an aloof legal science, promoting a legal
logic which is ill-attuned to the world of reality and ill adapted to
social demands. A formalist system that is stultifying in it rigidity
and confining in its sphere of application, inhibits our educators
from advancing the very real link between legal theory and legal
practice.' 4 A rigid sense of formalism prevents legal education,
legal practice and legal reform from finding their natural meeting
point within the institutional centre of legal learning, the law school
itself.
In the final analysis, the image of our legal institution is coloured
by the image which we project of ourselves to the public at large.
Our teachers are drawn from the public. Our students emanate from
the community domain. Within the community at large, our
reputation is won or lost, developed or retarded; for it is the
taxpayer, the government and the legal community who determine
our fate though their perception of the lawyer as a functioning entity
within the social milieu. Achieving a positive public image is not
beyond the control of our law schools. Through conscious planning
and through constant communication between legal and social
institutions, our Canadian law schools are able to cultivate their
roles as productive institutions responding to indigenous community
14. Dean John Cribbett of Illinois Law School aptly described the link between
legal theory and legal practice in this way: ". . . it [The Law School] faces in two
directions; inward toward the Univ ersity, with its interst in the intellectual life and
its concern for the transmission and development of knowledge through research
and teaching, and outward toward the law in action as opposed to the law in
books." In Cribbett, Report to the Chancellor for 1977-78, College of Law,
University of Illinois at Champaign-Urbana, at 2.
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dictates. Necessity itself dictates that our law students must be
educated with a view to their community functions, with a view to
their actual and their potential roles in the work force. Society needs
to be educated as to the salient roles - the utility - of lawyers as
functionaries within the social fabric, working towards community
ends. The public represents our central link to government. The
public is the source of our goodwill, our funding and our repute at
large. We cannot ignore our responsibility to them if we are to serve
and, in turn, be served by them.1
5
CONCLUSION
Educational excellence is constantly sought for, but seldom
attained. Nor should it be otherwise. An easy victory is unlikely to
be a lasting one. Limited effort surely means limited achievement,
whilst unbridled striving surely infers productivity.
From an academic perspective, our education in law is at the
crossroads between formalism and functionalism. In more recent
years a functional legal education has come to prevail in our
Canadian law schools. Thus there now arises a demand for an
integrated approach towards legal education, for a link between
legal theory and legal practice, for a blend between legal rules, legal
reasoning and analytical legal skills. Law teachers cannot be robots,
denied of their individuality in approach. Yet neither can legal
programmes prevail without deliberate planning and coordination of
effort. While teachers in law cannot be marshalled into a straight
jacket lacking in individual features, coordination of functions in
our Canadian law schools is imperative if we are truly to advance as
centres of legal learning, ever progressing in our socio-legal stature.
The established tradition of our Canadian law schools demon-
strates the past direction of our legal education within an adapted
It is surely in this context, namely, in the link between legal theory and legal
practice, that clinical law has its primary value as a course of study within our
Canadian law schools. For a bibliography on clinical law programmes in North
American Law Schools, see Trakman supra note 8 at notes 35-6.
15. See in general Cecil Wright, Law As a University Discipline (1962), 14
U.T.L.J. 253; Parker, The Politics of Legal Education (1974), 4 U. Tas. L.R. 276;
McKay, Legal Education: Law, Lawyers and Ethics (1974), 23 De Paul L. Rev.
641; Thomforde, Public Opinion of the Legal Profession: A Necessary Response
by the Bar and the Law School (1974), 41 Tenn. L. Rev. 503; Allen, Causes of
Popular Dissatisfaction with Legal Education (1976), 62 A.B.A.J. 447; Arthurs,
Paradoxes of Canadian Legal Education (1977), 3 Dal. L.J. 639. See too supra
notes 1 and 2.
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Anglo-American legal model. Our prior orientation in education
shows a potential pathway to the future. Yet how successfully we
educate in the present day in our Canadian law schools will hinge
upon our capacity to translate a borrowed legal heritage into a
Canadian future through the employment of our own energies in the
present.
